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NEW PATHS FOR THE COURT: 
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED JUVENILES UNDER MIRANDA; 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; AND HABEAS 







During the 2010/2011 Term, the Supreme Court continued to 
engage in two of the trends that have been established over the past 
couple of decades: first, that the Court treats juveniles differently 
than adults,1 and, second, that the Court seeks to limit federal review 
of state convictions, especially in cases involving claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel and habeas corpus.2  In the cases of this 
Term, the Court reemphasized its previous holdings and sought to 
 
* Bruce K. Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law 
Center; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.  Special thanks to Daniel Fier and Robert Mitchell 
for their diligent research and invaluable editing assistance with this article. 
1 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that a defendant 
that was fifteen years old at the time he was convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sen-
tenced to death pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court‘s ―acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from 
the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be 
treated differently from adults‖); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (stating 
that the State‘s ―power . . . to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its 
authority over adults‖ (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).  During this Term, the Court focused particularly on the treat-
ment of juveniles under the prophylactic rule established in its holding in Miranda v. Arizo-
na.  See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011); see also Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that the accused must be clearly informed of his 
right to remain silent, that what he says can and will be used against him at trial, that he has 
the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if he is indigent, the court 
may appoint an attorney for him at no cost to him). 
2 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 
(2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 
(2011). 
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expound upon them to provide clearer guidance to the federal judi-
ciary to utilize in its review of state court decisions relating to the va-
lidity of a criminal conviction. 
II. TREATMENT OF JUVENILES BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court‘s holding in Roper v. Simmons3 is just 
one recent example of the special considerations juveniles have re-
ceived as far as protections afforded under our Constitution.4  In Ro-
per, the Court held that a death penalty sentence for a juvenile under 
the age of eighteen constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.5  This determina-
tion that juveniles need to be treated differently than adults was rein-
forced by the Court‘s holding in a case during last year‘s Term, Gra-
ham v. Florida.6  The Court in Graham determined that the juvenile 
defendant‘s life sentence in prison without the chance of parole in a 
non-homicide case constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment.7  Juveniles must, at a minimum, have a mea-
ningful opportunity to obtain release from incarceration at some point 
in their lives in such cases.8  The defendant in Graham was resen-
tenced in February of 2012 to a prison term of 25 years.9 
 
3 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; Bellotti, 
443 U.S. 622; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. 
5 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (―The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of 
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were com-
mitted.‖); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖). 
6 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
7 Id. at 2034.  The Attorney General of Florida expressed satisfaction that ―the ruling does 
not prohibit ‗very stern sentences for juveniles.‘ ‖  John Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?, 
YOUTH TODAY, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.youthtoday.org/view 
_article.cfm?article_id=4031. 
8 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (―A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, 
but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity 
to obtain release before the end of that term.‖). 
9 Phone Interview by Daniel Fier with Bryan S. Gowdy, Attorney for Terrence Graham 
(Mar. 7, 2012) (―The defendant Graham was sentenced to 25 years in prison to be followed 
by two years of community control and three subsequent years of probation.  The defendant 
will not be eligible for parole at any point prior to the expiration of his prison sentence; how-
ever he may be eligible for Gaintime.  Gaintime may serve to reduce his sentence by 15%, to 
a total of 21.25 years to be served.  When he is released, Graham will be approximately thir-
ty-eight years old.‖).  For clarification on Gaintime in Florida, see FAQ: Gaintime, FL. 
2
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During this year‘s Term, the Court considered yet another 
case in which it determined that juveniles should receive different 
treatment than that which adults are given by the courts.  In J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina,10 the Court examined the issue of whether a juvenile 
should receive greater protection under the rules established in Mi-
randa v. Arizona11 due to his or her immaturity or heightened vulne-
rability.12  In J.D.B., the suspect in question, a thirteen year-old se-
venth grader, was escorted out of his social studies classroom by a 
police officer and then brought into a conference room where another 
officer, along with a school administrator and assistant principal, was 
present.13  J.D.B. was then questioned for thirty to forty-five minutes 
about two break-ins of homes that had occurred five days earlier.14  
At no point during his interrogation was J.D.B. read his Miranda 
warnings, informed of his right to leave, or given the opportunity to 
contact his legal guardian.15  While in the apparent custody of the of-
ficers, J.D.B. eventually ―confessed that he and a friend were respon-
sible for the break-ins.‖16  At this point, J.D.B. was first informed of 
his Miranda rights.17 
The issues the Court was concerned with in J.D.B. were 
whether the suspect was actually in police custody when he was 
questioned, whether the subsequent statements made could be used 
against him since no Miranda warnings had been given, and lastly, 
whether the suspect‘s age should play a role in such an analysis.18  
The traditional test to determine whether an individual is in custody, 
 
DEP‘T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/inmates/gaintime.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012). 
10 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
11 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see supra information accompanying note 1. 
12 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401 (―[The Court] granted certiorari to determine whether the Mi-
randa custody analysis includes consideration of a juvenile suspect‘s age.‖). 
13 Id. at 2399. 
14 Id. (Police also questioned J.D.B.‘s grandmother regarding the break-ins.  The officers 
were later informed by the school that a digital camera, one of the items reported stolen, was 
found in J.D.B.‘s possession.). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2400. 
17 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400 (stating that only after J.D.B‘s admission did [Investigator] 
DiCostanzo ―inform[] J.D.B. that he could refuse to answer the investigator‘s questions and 
that he was free to leave‖). 
18 Id. at 2401. 
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established in the cases following Miranda,19 is whether a reasonable 
person in that individual‘s position would have understood that he or 
she was free to terminate questioning and leave the room.20  In 
Berkemer v. McCarty,21 the Court determined that such a test should 
be objectively applied, and that subjective factors—such as intelli-
gence, age, and occupation—should not be taken into consideration.22  
The issue in J.D.B. was whether age should be a factor in the overall 
determination of whether a suspect knew that he was free to leave the 
location where the police questioning was being conducted. 
In a five-four decision, the Court in J.D.B. held that the age of 
the suspect, while not necessarily a determinative factor, is crucial in 
determining whether the suspect knew he was free to leave while be-
ing interrogated by a police officer.23  In a strongly worded opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court,24 stated that: 
To hold, as the State requests, that a child‘s age is 
never relevant to whether a suspect has been taken in-
to custody—and thus to ignore the very real differenc-
es between children and adults—would be to deny 
children the full scope of the procedural safeguards 
that Miranda guarantees to adults.25 
 
19 See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113 (1995) (holding that the determina-
tion of whether an individual would understand that they were in custody or that they could 
terminate interrogation ―presents a ‗mixed question of law and fact‘ qualifying for indepen-
dent review‖); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (holding that in order to 
determine whether a person was actually in custody, ―a court must examine all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‗the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there 
[was] a ‗formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement‘ of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest‘ ‖ (alteration in original) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 
(1983))); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (―Questioning by captors, who appear 
to control the suspect‘s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has 
assumed will weaken the suspect‘s will . . . .‖). 
20 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402 (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. 99). 
21 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
22 Id. at 442 n.35 (―[A]n objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate because . . . it ‗is not 
solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defen-
dant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncra-
cies [sic] of every person whom they question.‘ ‖). 
23 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (stating that consideration of a suspect‘s age ―is consistent 
with the objective nature of [a custody analysis]‖). 
24 Justice Sotomayor was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in the 
majority opinion.  Id. at 2398. 
25 Id. at 2407. 
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The Court in J.D.B. explained that in cases such as this, ―the custody 
analysis would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the sus-
pect‘s age.‖26  The Court concluded that a child in a similar position 
to J.D.B. would be much more likely to submit to police questioning, 
and much less likely to understand that he or she was free to leave 
than would an adult.27  The Court observed that this was a ―common-
sense reality.‖28  The Court cited the Brief for Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth et al.29 in concluding that there exists a heigh-
tened risk of false confessions among minors, especially those in a 
position similar to J.D.B.‘s.30  The line between a truthful and false 
confession, the Court went on to state, is blurred even further due to 
the ―inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.‖31  The po-
lice not only failed to tell J.D.B. that he was free to leave, but also did 
not provide him with the opportunity to call his legal guardian–his 
grandmother.32 
The dissent emphasized that the holding of J.D.B. marks a 
point where the Court may have begun a slide down a slippery slope 
when it comes to determining whether someone would reasonably 
understand that he or she was in custody.33  By including a considera-
tion of the suspect‘s age in such a custody analysis, the Court may 
have been opening the door to any variety of personal characteristics 
that could impact such a test.34  Justice Alito proceeded to stress that 
since its inception, the criteria to determine whether one was in cus-
 
26 Id. at 2405. 
27 Id. at 2403 (―[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel 
pressured to submit [to interrogation] when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.‖). 
28 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399. 
29 Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2010 WL 5385329, at *21 (collecting 
empirical studies that ―illustrate the heightened risk of false confessions from youth‖). 
30 Id.; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401. 
31 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401, 2403 (stating that young age and immaturity would increase 
the likelihood of a false confession). 
32 Id. at 2399. 
33 Id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that by allowing consideration of age in a cus-
tody analysis, ―the Court will[, in the future,] be forced to choose between two unpalatable 
alternatives[:]‖ first, to ―limit [its] decision [in J.D.B.] by arbitrarily distinguishing a sus-
pect‘s age from other personal characteristics,‖ or second, ―to effect a fundamental transfor-
mation of the Miranda custody test . . . into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the 
voluntariness test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory‖). 
34 Id. 
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tody were to be applied objectively, and, any subsequent subjective 
consideration would devalue and further obscure Miranda.35 
Justice Alito‘s concern was that the Court‘s holding would di-
lute the clarity of Miranda—one of the chief justifications, the Justice 
claimed, for its existence.36  By combining Miranda‘s objective ap-
plication with subjective considerations, it was questioned whether 
there is any longer any justification for Miranda itself.  ―[U]nless the 
Miranda custody rule is . . . to be radically transformed into one that  
. . . account[s for] the wide range of individual characteristics that are 
relevant in determining whether a confession is voluntary, the Court 
must shoulder the burden of explaining why age is different [and de-
serves consideration apart] from these other personal characteris-
tics.‖37 
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PETITIONS FOR 
HABEAS CORPUS 
In the 2010 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a number 
of habeas corpus cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.38  A common theme resonated from each of these: there will 
be a reduction of federal review of criminal convictions, which oc-
curred in the state courts.39 
In Cullen v. Pinholster,40 the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to the death penalty.41  In 1982, the de-
fendant, Scott Pinholster, and two accomplices, were involved in a 
robbery at the home of a local drug dealer.42  After they broke into 
the home and ransacked the place, two friends of the drug dealer un-
 
35 Id. at 2415 (―If the Court chooses [to extend its holding in J.D.B.], then a core virtue of 
Miranda—the ‗ease and clarity of its application‘—will be lost.‖ (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986))). 
36 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2415. 
37 Id. at 2414. 
38 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388; Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733; Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770. 
39 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (―We now hold that [federal habeas] review . . . is 
limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the me-
rits.‖); Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (―[S]ubstantial deference must be accorded to counsel‘s 
judgment.‖); Richter, 131 S. Ct at 785 (―A state court must be granted deference and latitude 
. . . .‖). 
40 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
41 Id. at 1396. 
42 Id. at 1394. 
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expectedly arrived on the scene.43  After the friends threatened to call 
the police, Pinholster used a buck knife and repeatedly stabbed both 
men in the chest.44  Pinholster robbed the victims, kicked one of them 
many times in the head, and left the scene.45  Both men died from 
their injuries.46  The proceeds of the robbery were twenty-three dol-
lars and a quarter ounce of marijuana.47  Two weeks after the crime, 
one of Pinholster‘s accomplices turned himself into the police and 
turned state witness;48 Pinholster was ultimately found guilty of two 
counts of first-degree murder.49  Subsequently, Pinholster exhausted 
all state remedies for review of his conviction.50   
There are potentially two separate stages in the prosecution of 
death penalty cases: the guilt phase and the penalty phase.51  During 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1394-95. 





50 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1395. 
51 Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam).  Furman is the 
seminal case which temporarily stopped all death penalty sentencing and executions in the 
United States, because certain state death penalty laws created an arbitrary manner in which 
death was imposed.  The Court in Furman held that the ―carrying out of the death penalty in 
these cases constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.‖  408 U.S. at 240; see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (―[T]he 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death un-
der legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly im-
posed.‖); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).  In Gregg, the case that re-
established death penalty sentencing in the United States, the Court stated that: 
     Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty Per se vi-
olates the Constitution‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishments . . . .  Be-
cause of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could 
not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial 
risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188; see id. at 191-92 (―When a human life is at stake and when the jury 
must have information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of pe-
nalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure eli-
mination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.‖); id. at 206 (―The new . . . 
sentencing procedures . . . focus the jury‘s attention on the particularized nature of the crime 
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.  [T]he jury is permitted to 
consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.‖); id. at 207 (―[W]e hold that the sta-
tutory system under which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitu-
tion.‖). 
7
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the guilt phase, the jury‘s responsibility is to make the determination 
as to whether the defendant is guilty of the murder with which he is 
charged.52  If guilt is found, then the penalty phase begins.53  At the 
penalty phase, the job of the same jury is to determine whether the 
aggravating factors related to the defendant and to the nature of the 
crime outweigh any possible mitigating factors.54  An aggravating 
circumstance is a factor that increases ―the degree of moral culpabili-
 
52 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1395. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1395-96; see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181 (2006) (stating the Court 
held that a ―capital sentencing system, which directs the imposition of the death penalty 
when a jury finds that aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise, is constitu-
tional‖).  The facts established that Michael Marsh broke into the unoccupied home of the 
Marry Ane Pusch.  Marsh, 548 U.S. at 166.  Upon her return, Marsh repeatedly shot her and 
slashed her throat.  Id.  Marsh set fire to the home, and Ms. Pusch‘s 19-month-old daughter 
was burned to death.  Id. (―The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of . . . 
aggravating circumstances, and that those circumstances were not outweighed by any miti-
gating circumstances.‖). 
[Here the State] bears the additional burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by miti-
gating circumstances.  [T]he defendant appropriately bears the burden of 
proffering mitigating circumstances—a burden of production—he never 
bears the burden of demonstrating that mitigating circumstances out-
weigh aggravating circumstances.  Instead, the State always has the bur-
den of demonstrating that mitigating evidence does not outweigh aggra-
vating evidence. 
Id. at 178-79.  See generally Brief for Petitioner, Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (No. 
04-1170) 2005 WL 3157602, at *18-19.  In the brief, the petitioner states: 
Arizona‘s capital sentencing law . . . operates in functionally the same 
manner as the Kansas law.  Idaho‘s law is likewise differently worded, 
but similar in function.  [S]ome states have adopted capital sentencing 
laws with different weighing equations [those states include Ohio and 
Indiana].  And other states, including Texas, have chosen to adopt capital 
sentencing systems with no weighing equation whatsoever . . . yet this 
Court has found it to be constitutional. 
Id.; Brief for Petitioner as Amici Curiae in Supporting Petitioner, Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163 (2006) (No. 04-1170) 2005 WL 1986025, at *2 (―[N]umerous States . . . do not currently 
require any weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors [those states include Georgia, 
Louisiana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington].‖); see also 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990) (―The presence of aggravating cir-
cumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the 
Eighth Amendment does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined 
or weighed by a jury.‖).  The Court has held only that a sentencer must consider any mitigat-
ing factors and has ―emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evi-
dence . . . [and the State must] not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant miti-
gating evidence.‖  Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998). 
8
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ty or blame‖ of the defendant in regards to the murder committed.55  
A mitigating circumstance decreases ―the degree of moral culpability 
of blame‖ and ―fairness or mercy may be considered‖ to ―justify a 
sentence of less than death‖ for a defendant in a capital crime case.56  
The Court has determined that a statute that limits or prevents a jury 
from considering any and all mitigating factors which are offered by 
the defense ―creates [a] risk the death penalty will be imposed‖ and 
that risk is incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth and 
Eight Amendments.57  If aggravators outweigh, or are in equipoise 
with, mitigators, the jury is allowed to impose the death penalty.58 
In Pinholster, the claim was the defendant was not provided 
the effective assistance of counsel59 in that defendant‘s counsel failed 
to take necessary steps to address the mitigating issues to the jury.60  
Specifically, the defense attorney had never mentioned the defen-
dant‘s existing medical records.61  Therefore, jurors were not exposed 
to any expert testimony regarding the defendant‘s epileptic condition, 
incidents of head trauma received from two automobile accidents, nor 
the fact that as a twelve-year-old he was sent to a mental institution.62 
The Supreme Court of California upheld the death penalty,63 
 
55 See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 176; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002) (stating 
that some examples of aggravating circumstances might include a defendant: ―knowingly 
create[ing] a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to‖ the murdered 
victim during the offense, receiving money for the commission of a murder, committing the 
offense ―in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,‖ and committing the offense 
while in custody or on probation).  Other aggravating factors could pertain to age of victim, 
for example, under fifteen or over seventy-five years old, or the number of victims, or the 
profession of the victim, for example, a law enforcement officer or a judge, and any prior 
convictions of the defendant.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 593. 
56 See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 176; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  The 
Court held that: 
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . 
not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of 
a defendant‘s character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. 
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original). 
57 Id. at 605. 
58 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 179-80. 
59 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396. 
60 Id. (stating defense counsel ―failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evi-
dence, including evidence of mental disorders‖). 
61 Id. at 1395. 
62 Id. at 1409. 
63 Id. at 1397. 
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and, accordingly, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief in the 
federal system.64  The District Court proceeded to conduct a hearing 
where new psychiatric evidence was introduced.65  The evidence in-
dicated that the defendant had a record of serious mental problems.66  
The District Court granted the habeas relief petition ―for inadequacy 
of counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at 
the penalty hearing.‖67  In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit con-
firmed the overturning of the death penalty based upon ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.68  However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and a habeas review was conducted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),69 as 
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (―AEDPA‖).70 
The Supreme Court determined that its review would be 
strictly limited to what had been presented at the California state 
court level.71  The consideration of the new evidence by the District 
Court and the Ninth Circuit was labeled as inappropriate.72  The evi-
dence presented to the California Supreme Court and that court‘s de-
 
64 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1397. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (stating expert medical witnesses testified the defendant suffered from ―organic per-
sonality syndrome‖ and ―epilepsy and brain injury‖). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (―Taking the District Court evidence into account, the en banc court determined that 
the California Supreme Court unreasonably . . . den[ied] Pinholster‘s claim of penalty-phase 
ineffective assistance of counsel.‖). 
69 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).  § 2254(d) reads as follows: 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasona-
ble application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro-
ceeding. 
Id. 
70 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
71 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (―We now hold that review . . . is limited to the record 
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.‖). 
72 Id. at 1401 (―[W]e conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the District 
Court evidence in its review . . . .‖). 
10
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cision on the matter based on that evidence is all that should be re-
viewed.73  AEDPA requires overturning a conviction or a sentence 
only if the sentence or the conviction was found to be unreasonable,74 
and a high degree of deference is to be given to the state court.75  The 
role of the federal court is only to review a state court‘s decision as of 
the time it was made.76  Therefore, a very high level of deference is 
required to be given to the state court‘s holding as to the effectiveness 
and competency of the defense attorney in this matter.77 
The crucial case that governs claims based on ineffective as-
sistance of counsel has been Strickland v. Washington.78  The first 
part of the Strickland decision requires the courts to be deferential to 
an attorney‘s strategic choices.79  In a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, competence shall be presumed.80  In Pinholster, the Court 
again re-emphasized that the courts are to be highly deferential in de-
termining whether or not an attorney was effective.81  The holding, 
furthermore, highlights an apparent need for what can be classified as 
a doubly highly deferential standard.82  A state court is to be highly 
deferential when it reviews whether counsel was effective,83 and this 
 
73 Id. at 1398 (―[R]eview is limited to the record that was before the state court that adju-
dicated the claim on the merits.  [The defendant] contends that evidence presented to the 
federal habeas court may also be considered.  We agree with the State.‖). 
74 Id. at 1402 (―In these circumstances, [the defendant] can satisfy the ‗unreasonable ap-
plication prong‘ . . . only by showing that ‗there was no reasonable basis‘ for the California 
Supreme Court‘s decision.‖ (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784)). 
75 Id. at 1398 (stating there is a ― ‗highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court 
rulings‘ ‖ (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002))). 
76 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399 (―Limiting . . . review to the state-court record is consis-
tent with our precedents . . . .‖). 
77 Id. at 1403 (―[C]ounsel should be ‗strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assis-
tance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional         
judgment . . . .‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984))). 
78 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
79 Id. at 689 (―Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential.‖). 
80 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403.  But see Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1477 (1999).  The Strickland opinion 
has been widely criticized as one which has allowed many convictions to be upheld in spite 
of the clear incompetence of defense counsel. 
81 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1407 (―Strickland specifically commands that a court ‗must 
indulge [the] strong presumption‘ that counsel ‗made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment.‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90)). 
82 Id. at 1403 (―Our review of the California Supreme Court‘s decision is thus ‗doubly 
deferential.‘ ‖ (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009))). 
83 See, e.g., id. at 1402 (stating that the California Supreme Court denied each petition as 
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is followed by the federal courts acting in a highly deferential manner 
in the assessment of the state court‘s decision.84  The double deferen-
tial standard governs the Supreme Court‘s review of ineffectiveness 
claims; Justice Thomas‘s decision was very clear: ―[o]ur review . . . 
is thus ‗doubly deferential.‘ ‖85 
In Pinholster, the main issue was whether the Ninth Circuit 
acted improperly in considering new evidence not presented during 
the trial.86  In a very forceful dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined in 
part by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, chastised the Court‘s deci-
sion.87  In Sotomayor‘s view, the majority held that even if it is abun-
dantly clear that a defendant would be entitled to habeas relief due to 
new evidence being brought to the attention of a federal district court, 
the courts are to turn a blind eye to it.88  The reasoning for the failure 
to provide relief would be that the new evidence was not presented 
before the state court at the time at which the state court‘s decision 
was determined.89  Sotomayor suggests possible impropriety in the 
Court‘s holding; she wrote, ―[T]he majority omits critical details re-
lating to the performance of [the] trial counsel, the mitigating evi-
dence they failed to discover, and the history of these proceedings.‖90  
She concludes by highlighting the fact that the trial lawyer did vir-
tually no investigation in the death penalty case and never looked into 
what would be the most significant factors to raise in possible mitiga-
tion.91 
The new evidence revealed in the federal district court hear-
 
having no merits). 
84 See id. at 1398 (stating a ― ‗highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rul-
ings, which demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‘ ‖ (quot-
ing Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24)). 
85 Id. at 1403 (quoting Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123). 
86 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1397 (stating the Court of Appeals ―determined that new evi-
dence from the hearing could be considered‖). 
87 Id. at 1413 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating ―[t]his holding is unnecessary . . . and it 
is inconsistent with . . . our precedents.‖). 
88 Id. (―[F]ederal courts must turn a blind eye to new evidence in deciding whether a peti-
tioner has satisfied . . . [a] threshold obstacle to federal habeas relief – even when it is clear 
that the petitioner would be entitled to relief in light of that evidence.‖). 
89 Id. (stating the ―analysis is limited to the state-court record‖). 
90 Id. at 1422. 
91 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1435 (―[T]he evidence confirmed what was already apparent 
from the state-court record: [the defense] counsel failed to conduct an adequate mitigation 
investigation . . . .‖). 
12
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ing raised important issues that sharply contrasted with the evidence 
heard by the jury which was determining whether there was any poss-
ible mitigation.92  There were new revelations that the defendant suf-
fered organic brain damage, mental disease, childhood beatings, ab-
andonment, and a family history filled with violence and mental 
illness.93  Additional facts which were revealed included information 
that a psychiatrist had recommended shortly before the murder that 
had taken place that the defendant be admitted to a psychiatric facili-
ty because he was diagnosed as suffering from severe psychosis.94  
This type of evidence certainly has the potential of being highly sig-
nificant.95  Historically in death penalty cases, when a jury assesses 
mitigating factors the existence of a mental disorder may lead jurors 
to find the defendant less culpable, and therefore not as responsible 
for the murder, because of the debilitating effects associated with 
mental illness.96 
Another decision of the Court which involved a habeas corpus 
matter, Premo v. Moore,97 shifted focus to the plea bargaining arena 
and also involved an ineffective counsel claim.98  In December of 
1995, the defendant, Randy Moore, and two accomplices attacked 
Kenneth Rogers99 by assaulting him in his home and tying him up 
with duct tape.100  Moore and his two accomplices threw Rogers in a 
car truck and drove to a desolate area in the Oregon countryside.101  
 
92 See id. (―The additional evidence presented at the hearing only confirmed that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court could not reasonably have rejected [the defendant‘s] claim.‖). 
93 Id. at 1434 (stating expert testimony included the defendant suffering from ―childhood 
head traumas, history of epilepsy, abusive and neglected upbringing, history of substance 
abuse, and bizarre behavior‖ and ―antisocial personality disorder‖). 
94 Id. at 1425 (―Just months before the homicides, a doctor recommended placement in the 
Hope Psychiatric Institute, but this did not occur.‖). 
95 Id. at 1432 (―[I]t was especially important for counsel to present the available evidence 
to help the jury understand [the defendant].‖). 
96 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1433 (―[I]t is not a foregone conclusion, as the majority 
deems it, that a juror familiar with [the defendant‘s] troubled background and psychiatric 
issues would have reached the same conclusion regarding [the defendant‘s] culpability.‖). 
97 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011). 
98 Id. at 738 (―The instant case . . . concerns the adequacy of representation in providing 
an assessment of a plea bargain without first seeking suppression of a confession assumed to 
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Upon arriving at the isolated area, it was maintained that Moore shot 
Rogers in the temple and killed him.102  Moore told the police that he 
only wanted to scare Rogers;103 the plan was to leave Rogers in an 
unknown area and force him to walk home alone.104  Moore claimed 
he took the gun from one of his accomplices,105 and at the time 
Moore grabbed the gun, Rogers ―slipped backwards in the mud and 
the gun discharged.‖106 
The defendant‘s lawyer advised his client to take a plea of 
three hundred months to a felony murder charge.107  The defense 
lawyer had not engaged in any attempt to have the defendant‘s con-
fession or previous statement to a police officer held to be inadmissi-
ble.108  Instead, the lawyer completely bypassed such motion and 
simply advised the defendant to enter the plea.109  The defendant did, 
 
102 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738. 
103 Id.; see Brief for Respondent, Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011) (No. 09-658) 
2010 WL 3251630, at *2 (―[T]he prosecutor stated at Mr. Moore‘s sentencing, after Rogers 
had burglarized the home of a mutual friend, Moore and several other men ‗were going to 
take [Rogers] out into the woods, release him and let him walk home, basically, to put the 
fear of God in him at least.‘ ‖ (second alteration in the original)). 
104 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738. 
105 Id.; see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *2 (―While walking up [a] hill, 
one of the other men fell in the mud.  Mr. Moore took the gun.‖). 
106 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738; see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *2 (―Shortly 
after, Rogers slipped and fell into Mr. Moore and the gun discharged, killing Rogers.‖). 
107 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 738; see also Brief for the Respondent, supra note 103, at *3. 
            Two days after the shooting, Mr. Moore went to the police sta-
tion with his half-brother, Lonnie Woolhiser (the man who fell first on 
the hill), his brother, Raymond, and his half-brother‘s girlfriend, Debbie 
Zeigler.  Either on the ride or before, Mr. Moore told Raymond and 
Zeigler something about the incident.  When questioned by the police, 
Mr. Moore placed himself at the scene, admitted his participation in tak-
ing Rogers to the hill, and described the shooting accident.  This tape-
recorded statement was obtained through promises of leniency and after 
the police ignored Mr. Moore‘s request for counsel.   
             Mr. Moore‘s attorney failed to recognize that the police had un-
constitutionally obtained the statement and did not move for its suppres-
sion.   
             Shortly after entering his plea of nolo contendere, Mr. Moore 
decided to seek to withdraw it, but was talked out of those efforts. 
Id. 
108 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 740 (―The question becomes whether [the defendant‘s] counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression of [the defendant‘s] confession 
to police before advising [the defendant] regarding the plea.‖). 
109 Id. at 738 (stating defense lawyer did ―not file[ ] a motion to suppress [the] confession 
14
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upon the advice of counsel, enter a plea of no contest to the 
charges.110  Subsequently, the defendant filed a claim that the defense 
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.111  The basis for 
the petition was that the lawyer did not pursue a challenge to the con-
fession or the statement to the police officer.112  The petition alleged 
that there were some very legitimate challenges to the defendant‘s 
statement to the police that could have and should have been pur-
sued.113  The failure of the lawyer to have engaged in what could 
have proven to be a crucial pretrial motion, was claimed to constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.114 
The Ninth Circuit granted the defendant‘s petition for habeas 
corpus relief.115  The court held the state court‘s conclusion that the 
defense lawyer did not act ineffectively was unreasonable.116  The 
Ninth Circuit held Moore‘s taped confession to the police was highly 
damaging and unconstitutionally obtained, therefore, defense coun-
sel‘s failure to suppress the confession did not meet an ―objective 
standard of reasonableness‖ and ―constituted deficient performance‖ 
of counsel.117  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Justice Kennedy 
wrote the majority opinion.118  Kennedy relied on the Strickland dec-
laration that courts have a limited role in assessing a lawyer‘s compe-
 
to police in advance of the . . . advice that [the defendant] considered before accepting the 
plea‖). 
110 Id. (stating defendant ―agreed to plead no contest to felony murder in exchange for a 
sentence of 300 months‖). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (stating the defendant‘s claim ―that it was an accident when 
he shot the victim‖). 
114 See id. at 738.  Defense ―[c]ounsel . . . justified his decision by asserting that any mo-
tion to suppress was likely to fail.‖  Id. at 741. 
115 Id. at 739. 
116 Id. (―In [the Ninth Circuit‘s] view[,] the state court‘s conclusion that counsel‘s action 
did not constitute ineffective assistance was an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished law.‖). 
117 Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); id. at 1104 (―[T]he confes-
sion unconstitutionally obtained by the police was so critical to the prosecution and so da-
maging to Moore . . . .‖); id. at 1107 (―[T]he [S]tate has conceded that a motion to suppress 
Moore‘s confession would have succeeded.  Further, Moore‘s counsel did not ‗reasonably‘ 
reach his erroneous conclusion [not to file a motion to suppress], as he was entirely ignorant 
of the relevant law.‖). 
118 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 737-39. 
15
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tence.119  The opinion emphasized that lawyers must have the free-
dom to engage in strategic choices and the ability to make tactical de-
cisions.120  Therefore, the courts should substantially defer to the 
course of action a lawyer opted to take.121  A particular concern that 
might well arise from the Moore holding is that the Supreme Court 
seemed willing to sacrifice a meaningful examination of the effective 
assistance of counsel claim in the Court‘s desire for finality.122  The 
Court expressed the desirability and needs of the criminal justice sys-
tem for the plea bargaining process, and that pleas were presumed to 
be conclusive.123 
In Hill v. Lockhart,124 the Court held that the two-part Strick-
land test is to apply to challenges to plea bargain guilty pleas based 
upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.125  The first-part of 
the test is based upon an assessment of attorney competence.126  The 
second-part of the test is a ― ‗prejudice‘ ‖ requirement which focuses 
on whether the ineffective assistance of counsel ―affected the out-
come of the plea process.‖127  For example, if an attorney failed to 
uncover exculpatory evidence, the determination of  ―whether the er-
 
119 Id. at 741 (―[H]abeas courts must respect their limited role in determining whether 
there was manifest deficiency in light of information then available to counsel.‖) (citing 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)). 
120 Id. (―Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, 
and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and 
risks.‖). 
121 Id. at 740 (―[T]he standard for judging counsel‘s representation is a most deferential 
one.‖). 
122 Id. at 742 (―The prospect that a plea deal will afterwards be unraveled when a court 
second-guesses counsel‘s decisions . . . could lead prosecutors to forgo plea bargains that 
would benefit defendants, a result favorable to no one.‖). 
123 Moore, 131 S. Ct. at 742 (―Prosecutors must have assurances that a plea will not be 
undone years later.‖). 
124 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
125 Id. at 58. 
126 Id.; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (stating counsel should be ―strongly presumed to 
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of rea-
sonable professional judgment‖).  But see Hill, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring) (―The 
failure of an attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong 
of the Strickland analysis adopted by the majority, as such an omission cannot be said to fall 
within ‗the wide range of professionally competent assistance‘ demanded by the Sixth 
Amendment.‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)). 
127 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see id. (―In other words, in order to satisfy the ‗prejudice‘ re-
quirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.‖). 
16
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ror ‗prejudiced‘ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather 
than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the 
evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to 
the plea.‖128  This assessment objectively depends on ―whether the 
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of the trial.‖129  The 
same assessment would be made concerning a defense which could 
have possibly been raised at trial and whether the ―defense[s] likely 
would have succeeded at trial.‖130  Since the analysis is derived from 
the Strickland test, it has proven quite difficult for a defendant to 
meet the requirements or burden necessary to have a plea bargain 




130 Id.  In March of 2012, the Court greatly expanded the application of the Sixth 
Amendment right to other situations involving plea bargaining.  In recognizing the vital role 
that plea bargaining has in the criminal justice system, the Court declared that the entry of 
pleas constituted a ―critical stage‖ of the prosecution and therefore the right to counsel at-
tached.  Missouri v. Frye, No. 10–444, 2012 WL 932020, at *6-7 (U.S. March 21, 2012).  In 
Missouri v. Frye, the defense counsel had failed to inform his client that the prosecutor had 
offered a plea deal entailing a recommended sentence of ninety days.  Id. at *3.  After the 
offer had expired, and after once again the defendant had been charged with driving with a 
revoked license, the defendant pled guilty and received a sentence of three years.  Id. at *3-4.  
The Court applied the Strickland test and determined that the lawyer was deficient in failing 
to inform his client of the offer, and that the defendant had been prejudiced.  Id. at *9-11.  
The prejudice determination had two aspects: (1) would the defendant have accepted the plea 
offer had he known of it, and (2) would the court have abided by the plea deal.  Id. at *9-10.  
In Lafler v. Cooper, counsel had incorrectly informed his client that, were he to go to trial on 
the attempted murder charge, he could not be convicted because the bullet that was fired had 
hit the victim below the waist.  No. 10-209, 2012 WL 932019, at *3 (U.S. March 21, 2012).  
The pretrial offer by the prosecutor was for a sentence of 51-85 months; the sentence given 
by the court after trial was 185-360 months.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that the incorrect 
advice by counsel constituted inadequate representation and that the defendant had indeed 
been prejudiced.  Id. at *12. 
131 Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1367-68 (2004). 
[T]he [Supreme] Court emphasized [in Hill] that because the vast ma-
jority of criminal convictions arise from guilty pleas, the need for finality 
in judgment [is] particularly great. . . .  The standard set forth in Hill for 
a defendant to successfully challenge a plea bargain is an exceptionally 
demanding one.  Once the defendant has entered the guilty plea[,] there 
will ordinarily be no appellate review of counsel‘s preparation of the 
case.  [An] overburdened [defense attorney] knows, therefore, that if his 
client pleads guilty, counsel will not be examined as to what investiga-
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The Moore opinion reinforced the idea that pleas bring ―to the 
criminal justice a stability and a certainty that must not be under-
mined . . . .‖132  The Court emphasized that ―[h]indsight and second 
guesses are also inappropriate, and more often so, where a plea has 
been entered without a full trial . . . .‖133  The decision again relies on 
double deference and Justice Kennedy found that such deference is 
highly significant in light of the uncertainty inherent in plea negotia-
tions.134  The Court declared that ―[t]here is a most substantial burden 
. . . to show ineffective assistance‖ in cases involving the entrance of 
a plea.135  There are several levels of deference at play here: the fed-
eral courts are to have a limited role in reviewing what transpired at 
the state level; deference ought to be given due to the system‘s need 
for finality; and there should be an overall reluctance to find that the 
lawyer who recommended acceptance of the plea was ineffective.136 
In Harrington v. Richter,137 the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari following a reversal by the Ninth Circuit of the denial of defen-
dant‘s petition for a writ habeas corpus by the state supreme court 
and federal district court.138  The defendant asserted, among other 
grounds, that his attorney was ineffective in his assistance at trial.139 
Defendant Richter was among four individuals who had been 
smoking marijuana at the home of one of the men, Joshua Johnson.140  
Officers were later called to the house by Johnson who alleged that 
Richter and another man appeared in his bedroom when he awoke 
from his sleep.141  Johnson was shot by the other man, and Richter 
shot the fourth person, who was still in the living room.142  The two 
assailants proceeded to steal Johnson‘s pistol and $6,000 cash.143  
Evidence found at the scene, including shell casings, pools of blood, 
 




136 Id. at 745-46 (stating that pleas exist to provide ―stability and a certainty‖ and should 
not be emasculated by federal review absent unreasonable action at the state level). 
137 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
138 Id. at 783. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 781. 
141 Id. 
142 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 781. 
143 Id. 
18
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and blood spatters, corroborated Johnson‘s claims and was used at 
trial to convict Richter.144 
At trial, the district attorney had called two expert witnesses 
who testified in regard to whose blood was found at the scene of the 
crime, a matter which was essential to the defendant‘s claim of self-
defense.145  Defense counsel did not present a single expert witness of 
his own to challenge or refute the prosecution‘s experts.146  The de-
fendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison with-
out parole.147 
The defendant‘s writ of habeas corpus to the California Su-
preme Court asserted ineffective assistance of counsel and was ac-
companied by affidavits from several experts including a blood se-
rologist, pathologist, and a bloodstain analyst.148  It was claimed that 
these affidavits showed that the location and content of the blood 
pools, as well as the lack of ―satellite droplets‖ present, meant that 
the defendant‘s account of the conflict was the most truthful and such 
affidavits would solidify his claim of self-defense.149  The California 
Supreme Court summarily denied the writ in a single sentence sum-
mary order.150  The defendant then filed a petition for habeas corpus 
with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia asserting the same claims.151  Again, the writ was denied.152  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially affirmed the district 
 
144 Id. at 781-82 (―Blood evidence d[id] not appear to have been part of the prosecution‘s 
planned case prior to trial, . . . [b]ut the opening statement from the defense[, which hig-
hlighted the blood evidence as supporting a claim of self-defense,] led the prosecution to al-
ter its approach.‖). 
145 Id. at 782. 
146 Id. at 783 (Defendant ―claimed his counsel was deficient for failing to present expert 
testimony on serology, pathology, and blood spatter patterns . . . [which] he argued would 
disclose the source of the blood pool in the bedroom doorway,‖ a fact which would have 
supported his claim of self-defense.). 
147 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 782. 
148 Id. at 783. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.; Phone Interview by Daniel Fier with Cliff Gardner, Esq., attorney for defendant 
Richter (Feb. 29, 2012) (―The California Supreme Court‘s summary order simply stated that 
the defendant‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied.‖). 
151 Richter v. Hickman, No. S-01-CV-0643-JKS, S-01-CV-0963-JKS, 2006 WL 769199 
(E.D.Cal. March 24, 2006). 
152 Id. at *15 (holding that the defendants‘ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail 
to meet the burden imposed by the Court‘s holding in Strickland and are therefore denied). 
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court‘s decision to deny the petition.153  Defendant subsequently filed 
a petition for a rehearing and the Court of Appeals in an en banc 
hearing reversed its earlier decision.154 
The Supreme Court reviewed the case in order to determine 
whether the state court‘s order was an unreasonable adjudication on 
the case‘s merits, thereby triggering 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),155 as 
amended by the AEDPA, and, additionally, if the state court incor-
rectly applied the standard outlined in Strickland.156  In the Court‘s 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that even though a one 
sentence summary order157 makes it difficult to determine whether 
there was a reasonable and final determination of the case on the me-
rits, the burden is that of the habeas petitioner to show that the state 
court had ―no reasonable basis . . . to deny relief.‖158  The Court‘s 
opinion emphasized that courts are entitled and enabled to ―concen-
trate [their] resources on the cases where opinions are most needed,‖ 
and, therefore, a single sentence summary order can be fully suffi-
cient to imply an adequate reasonable basis for denying relief under § 
2254(d).159 
The Court also concluded that even when there exists a strong 
case for habeas relief, it does not directly imply that the state court‘s 
conclusion to the contrary was unreasonable under the AEDPA.160  
 
153 See Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 1222, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was 
no constitutional error at the trial court level which would have resulted in a different out-
come, and, therefore, the petition should be denied). 
154 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783; see Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that defense counsel‘s failure to present expert testimony to refute the State‘s ex-
perts represented ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, the denial of the petition by 
the district court should be reversed). 
155 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
156 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783-85. 
157 See supra information accompanying note 150. 
158 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) 
(holding that habeas relief is appropriate in cases where it can be shown that the court‘s deci-
sion was made ―contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law‖); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (stating that a reasoned judg-
ment issued by the state court need not explain every detail of its decision and that the ha-
beas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court‘s decision was unreasonable or not 
made on the merits). 
159 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (stating that the avoidance of ―collateral attack[s] in federal 
court‖ does not, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, comprise all the conditions of which the 
court considers when writing its opinions). 
160 Id. at 786 (referencing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). 
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The habeas corpus petition does not exist as a secondary remedy for 
the correction of state court holdings, but rather, to protect the peti-
tioner against ―extreme malfunctions‖ in the judicial process.161  For 
those reasons, the standard that exists for federal courts to grant ha-
beas relief is a substantial one that is difficult to meet.162 
The defendant‘s claim for habeas relief based upon the inef-
fective assistance of defense counsel depends upon whether counsel 
gave deficient assistance and if the resulting outcome was prejudiced 
due to counsel‘s actions or inactions.163  The Court, once again, em-
phasized that lawyers are to be given substantial leeway in the stra-
tegic and tactical decisions they make, and that a high level of defe-
rence is appropriate.164  In its review of the case, the Court 
determined that even given the failure of defense counsel to call his 
own expert witnesses, there was nothing to indicate that his perfor-
mance and assistance was ―deficient under Strickland,‖ and, there-
fore, the state court acted correctly in its utilization of Strickland.165  
The Court observed that a battle of the experts is not always neces-
sary for the adequate representation of a defendant and that, in this 
case, defense counsel skillfully and appropriately represented his 
client, utilizing mechanisms such as cross-examination to defeat 
some points of the state‘s expert witnesses.166  Since the state court‘s 
application of the standards for assessing possible ineffective assis-
tance of counsel was appropriate, the Court held that the Ninth Cir-
cuit erred in reversing the district court‘s decision.167 
The Supreme Court reviewed a fourth significant case involv-
 
161 Id.  
162 Id. (―As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on 
federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.‖); see Renico v. 
Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010) (holding that an incorrect ruling by a state court does not 
necessarily render that decision unreasonable pursuant to § 2254(d)); Brown v. Payton, 544 
U.S. 133, 147 (2005) (emphasis added) (holding that, absent proof of an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law, habeas relief is not available pursuant to § 2254(d)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. 
at 77 (holding that the ―gross disproportionality principle‖ regarding California‘s repeat of-
fender law, when applied for the purposes of § 2254(d), is not an unreasonable application of 
federal law, and, therefore, defendant‘s petition for habeas relief should be denied). 
163 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787. 
164 Id. at 789. 
165 Id. at 791. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 792. 
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ing a habeas petition this past Term, Felkner v. Jackson,168 also an 
appeal from the Ninth Circuit.169  In Jackson, the prosecution had 
used two peremptory challenges to strike two black jurors from the 
venire.170  Under the Court‘s holding in Batson v. Kentucky,171 race 
cannot be used as a basis for a peremptory challenge.172  If such a 
challenge is contested by the opposing party, the party that used the 
challenge must show that there was a race-neutral basis for the use of 
the said challenge.173  The defendant in Jackson had claimed that the 
two jurors were struck on the basis of their race,174 to which the pros-
ecution contended that race was not the factor which led to the use of 
the challenges.175  It was claimed that the first juror that was chal-
lenged had significant involvement with law enforcement officers 
and may, therefore, have harbored animosity.176  The second juror 
challenged had a background and degree in social work, which, the 
prosecutor maintained, may have clouded her judgment in the case.177  
The trial court accepted the prosecutor‘s explanation that the second 
juror was struck ―based on her educational background,‖ and that the 
prosecutor ―does not ‗like to keep social workers‘ ‖ on a jury.178 
After losing on appeal in the California Supreme Court, the 
defendant filed a petition for habeas relief with the federal court 
 
168 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011). 
169 Id. at 1307. 
170 Id. at 1305. 
171 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
172 Id. at 100 (holding that if the trial court is able to come to the determination that there 
is a prima facie showing that peremptory challenges were utilized on the basis of race and 
the prosecutor is unable to provide a sufficient race-neutral explanation for the use of said 
challenges, the challenges at issue are unconstitutional). 
173 Id. at 94 (―[T]he State must demonstrate that ‗permissible racially neutral selection cri-
teria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.‘ ‖ (quoting Alexander v. Lou-
isiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))). 
174 Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1305. 
175 Id. at 1306. 
176 Id. (stating that the juror in question was continuously stopped by police officers be-
tween the ages of 16-30, because of–in his words–―his race and age‖). 
177 Id. (explaining that the prosecutor believed said juror was prejudiced because of her 
previous internship at a jail, which the prosecutor alleged was ―probably in the psych unit as 
a sociologist of some sort‖). 
178 Id. (holding that the prosecution‘s use of peremptory challenges was race-neutral and 
that the defendant failed to meet his burden in proving purposeful discrimination in jury se-
lection). 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/3
  
2012] NEW PATHS FOR THE COURT 375 
 
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.179  As was the 
case in Richter,180 the federal court reviewed the case pursuant to the 
AEDPA and § 2254(d), subsection (2).181  The District Court denied 
the defendant‘s petition,182 but the denial was reversed by the Ninth 
Circuit.183  The Ninth Circuit offered the following in support of its 
decision: 
The prosecutor‘s proffered race-neutral bases for pe-
remptorily striking the two African-American jurors 
were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purpose-
ful discrimination in light of the fact that two out of 
three prospective African-American jurors were 
stricken, and the record reflected different treatment of 
comparably situated jurors.184 
In a strongly worded opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Ninth Circuit, and characterized the Circuit‘s decision as 
―inexplicable.‖185   
In its per curiam opinion, the Court stated that the trial court‘s 
review of a Batson challenge is largely based on an ― ‗evaluation of 
credibility‘ ‖ and that a ―trial court‘s determination is entitled to 
‗great deference.‘ ‖186  Furthermore, federal review of habeas peti-
tions under the AEDPA ― ‗demands that state-court decisions be giv-
en the benefit of the doubt.‘ ‖187  In both situations, deference to the 
findings of the state trial court is paramount absent the demonstration 
 
179 Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307. 
180 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783-85. 
181 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 
182 Jackson v. Felker, No. CIV 07-0555RJB, 2009 WL 426651, at *10 (E.D.Ca. Feb. 20, 
2009) (―The California state court decisions . . . were not contrary to or an unreasonable ap-
plication of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, nor did 
they result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented to the state courts.‖). 
183 Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307 (―After considering the state Court of Appeal[‘s] decision 
and reviewing the record evidence, the District Court held that the California Court of Ap-
peal‘s findings were not unreasonable.‖). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (stating that the decision of the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District Court ―is as in-
explicable as it is unexplained‖).  The Court emphasized that since ―[t]he state appellate 
court‘s decision was plainly not unreasonable[,] [t]here was simply no basis for the Ninth 
Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner.‖  Id. 
186 Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21). 
187 Jackson, 131 S. Ct. at 1307 (quoting Lett, 130 S. Ct. at 1862). 
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that there was no reasonable basis for the court to have denied relief 
to a defendant pursuant to § 2254(d).188  Since the defendant did not 
meet its burden of showing such an unreasonable basis, the Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit‘s decision.189  The language of the Court was 
sufficiently harsh that the Journal of the American Bar Association 
headlined that the ―Supreme Court Slaps 9th Circuit for ‗Inexplica-
ble‘ Decision in Batson Challenge.‖190 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The concept of habeas corpus predates even the Magna Carta, 
which, in the year 1215, recognized habeas as part of the ―law of the 
land.‖191  The Magna Carta itself states the principle that ―[n]o free 
man shall be seized or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment 
of his equals or by the law of the land.‖192  Our Constitution reorga-
nized and emphasized the great import of habeas: ―The Privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.‖193  
The Great Writ, protecting the individual against illegal imprison-
ment, was referred to by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Nelson194 as 
―the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom 
against arbitrary and lawless state action.‖195 
The powerful nature of the Writ as a guarantor of individual 
freedom has been threatened in recent years by a number of Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 




190 Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Slaps 9th Circuit for ‘Inexplicable’ Decision in 
Batson Challenge, ABA JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_slaps_9th_circuit_for_inexplicable_
decision_in_batson_challen/. 
191 The Text of the Magna Carta, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/magnacarta.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
192 Id. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
194 394 U.S. 286 (1969). 
195 Id. at 290-91. 
196 See, e.g., Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733; Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770; Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305; 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388. 
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of particular significance in their impact on the Writ‘s functioning as 
the ultimate protector of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  The level of concern expressed by many in the 
legal profession about these recent holdings can, perhaps, best be il-
lustrated in the following draft of a Resolution of the Defense Func-
tion Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar 
Association197: ―Resolved, that the American Bar Association urge 
Congress to restore the Writ of Habeas Corpus by amending 28 
U.S.C. [§] 2254(d) to remove unreasonable restrictions on the scope 
of the Writ which preclude relief for violations of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel.‖198  The proposed 
amendment would provide for the granting of the Writ simply upon a 
finding that the state court‘s adjudication of the claim ―resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved a misapplication of, clearly 
established Federal law . . . .‖199 
In Premo v. Moore,200 a case in which the state had not even 
challenged the defendant‘s claim that his confession to the police had 
been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, the Court held 
that although counsel had failed to move to suppress the illegally ob-
tained confession, the Writ was to be denied.201  In Harrington v. 
Richter,202 the Court emphasized that even when the state court deci-
sion denying the defendant‘s constitutional claim is limited to a sin-
gle sentence, deference must be given to the determination of the 
state court.203 
The Court‘s statement in Richter that habeas protects only 
when there have been ―extreme malfunctions in the state criminal jus-
tice systems,‖204 was strengthened by the Court‘s decision in Cullen 
v. Pinholster.205  In Pinholster, the Court held that any review of a 
state court conviction is to be strictly limited to the evidence and 
 
197 The author of this article is a member of the Committee. 
198 A copy of the proposed Resolution is on file with the Touro Law Review. 
199 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
200 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011). 
201 Id. at 744-46. 
202 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
203 Id. at 784-85. 
204 Id. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)). 
205 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
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record that was made at the state court level.206 
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,207 however, the Court did expand 
the constitutional protections that are afforded some individuals–in 
this case, juveniles.208  The Court held that when considering whether 
a suspect knew he was free to leave when interrogated by the police, 
the age of the individual needs to be taken into consideration when 
determining whether Miranda warnings were required.209  It was in 
J.D.B. that the Court this last Term delivered a decision that seemed 
at odds with the thrust of its other holdings regarding criminal law 
and procedure–the safeguards that are to be guaranteed by the Consti-
tution were actually expanded. 
 
206 Id. at 1398. 
207 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
208 Id. at 2408. 
209 Id. at 2406. 
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